Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (2012), 291–295. Alvin PLANTINGA, Where the Confl ict Really Lies: Science, Religion, & Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2011. 359 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-981209-7 In Where the Confl ict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga adds his voice to the debate over whether there is confl ict between science and religious belief, defending the thesis that "there is superfi cial confl ict but deep concord between science and theistic religion, but superfi cial concord and deep confl ict between science and naturalism" (ix). Th e book is, here and there, of relatively high calibre-only the most purblind anti-religionist will insist that Plantinga's defence of the fi rst part of his thesis is a non-starter-but it is also a disappointment, weak on new ideas and containing a number of eminently disputable, if not highly dubious, claims and arguments. Furthermore, and relatedly, the book is dialectically unsuccessful: discerning readers not already inclined to believe that there is no confl ict between science and religion will be unmoved. In chapters 1 and 2, Plantinga deals with the alleged tension between theistic belief and evolution, arguing that, contrary to what Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and others have claimed, there is no confl ict between them, since God created biological organisms via the process of evolution. Organisms evolved over billions of years-that much isn't rationally contestable given the avalanche of evidence for evolution-but that was God's handiwork: he used evolution to create organisms. (One is left wondering why a supposedly omnipotent and morally perfect deity used such a comically protracted, violent, and wasteful process to do this, a process that has caused, and continues to cause, countless billions of human and nonhuman animals to suff er grisly deaths from disease, starvation, predation, and so on. In an attempt to assuage the reader's befuddlement, Plantinga mentions a theodicy that, he admits, "is unlikely to become popular among secularists" and then makes the expected appeal to mystery (58f.).) But problems arise straightaway. Apart from expressing incredulity about there being enough time for a blind, unguided process to yield creatures like us (e.g., 22f.), Plantinga gives no reason to think that there has not been enough time for a blind, unguided process to yield creatures like us. Perhaps he is right that it has not been demonstrated that life is undesigned (this cannot, of course, be demonstrated); still, he hasn't given any reason to prefer his brand of evolutionary creationism to unguided natural selection. More on this later. In chapter 2, Plantinga takes particular aim at Daniel Dennett, reproaching him for putting too much stock in reason. In Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Dennett argues that if you can't show by reason that a source of religious belief is reliable, then it is irrational to accept the deliverances of that source. Plantinga responds by launching an argument from William Alston, according to which Dennett's argument embodies a double standard. Alston points out that we don't impose that kind of requirement on other sources of knowledge, such as perception and memory. We can't, arguably, show by reason, or otherwise noncircularly, that these sources of knowledge are reliable, but it doesn't follow that accepting their deliverances is irrational. So why, asks Plantinga, the double standard? "Why insist that it is irrational to accept religious belief in the absence of an argument for the reliability of the faculty or belief producing processes [faith, Calvin's 'sensus divinitatis,' etc.] that give rise to it? ... Why treat the sources of religious belief diff erently?" (48) But this seems clearly to be a bad argument. Perception and memory are universally regarded as reliable belief-forming faculties, whereas faith, a sensus divinitatis, etc. are not. Billions of people believe in gods other than the one Plantinga champions, and millions more are atheists or agnostics. Given the interminable controversy surrounding religious belief-a controversy for which there is patently no analogue when it comes to beliefs derived from perception and memory- and given that there isn't anything remotely resembling a good reason (bald assertions by dead theologians don't count) for believing 292 that some of the "sources" of religious belief- e.g., Calvin's sensus divinitatus-even exist, it is absurd, frankly, to suppose that the sources of religious belief are on a par epistemically with the sources of our other beliefs. What is Plantinga (and Alston) up to? Th e sources of religious belief are diff erent-radically diff erent-from the sources of our other beliefs because, simply, there is no reason to think that they generate true beliefs. And this, in turn, is because there is no reason to think that God, the alleged ultimate source of religious belief, exists. Plantinga is not deterred, obviously, by what he has dubbed "Great Pumpkin worries," but he should be, since they (or something like them) constitute a virtual reductio of the Alstonian argument he advances. Presumably he would dismiss as unserious an appeal by a remote tribespeople to, say, a "sensus goblinus" on behalf of their belief that there are invisible goblins living in watches making them tick, just as, presumably, he would dismiss as unserious an appeal to faith on behalf of such a belief; and his rationale for doing so would, presumably, be that there is no reason to believe that there are invisible goblins living in watches. But then why should anyone take seriously his appeal to an equally arbitrary sensus divinitatis on behalf of his belief in an invisible deity? Th e source of the belief that there are invisible goblins living in watches, whatever it is, is unreliable precisely because there is no reason to think that invisible-goblin beliefs are caused (down the line) by invisible goblins. Likewise, the source of one's belief in an invisible deity, whatever it is, is unreliable precisely because there is no reason to think that invisible-deity beliefs are caused by invisible deities. Th is diffi culty, notice, does not affl ict perception. We do not, and need not, mistrust the deliverances of this faculty for the simple reason that the objects (events, etc.) that it "delivers" are (or were) publicly observable. Indeed, this feature of the deliverances of this faculty is precisely what distinguishes them from the deliverances of hallucinations and dreams. Th e objects of hallucinations and dreams, unlike the objects of perception, aren't publicly observable, aren't checkable, so we regard hallucinations and dreams as unreliably related to the production of true beliefs. Similarly, the objects of faith, a sensus divinitatis, etc. aren't publically observable, so we regard these processes-or, at any rate, should regard these processes-as unreliably related to the production of true beliefs. Note that it won't do to rejoin by saying that the reason we conclude that beliefs caused by hallucinations are false is because, if they were true, we would expect the objects of hallucinations to be publicly observable, which isn't so for a private revelation from God. Th is won't do, because who is to say that any experienced object that isn't publicly observable isn't real? Th e "hallucinated" pink elephant could be real-nobody's denying that. Th e point is that, in virtue of its being publicly unobservable, we should (and do) assume that it isn't. Similarly, the objects of faith, a sensus divinitatus, etc. could be real. Th e point is that, in virtue of their being publicly unobservable, we should assume that they aren't, or at least suspend judgement about whether they are. In chapters 3 and 4, Plantinga examines the alleged confl ict between science and special divine action, focusing, in chapter 4, on the question of whether quantum mechanics prohibits divine providential action and answers to prayer. Some readers may, as I did, fi nd these chapters to be somewhat tedious. It seems to me vanishingly unlikely that there are supernatural entities of any kind-and, indeed, Plantinga's preferred deity is, to my mind, demonstrably impossible-but even if there is a god, there is no reason to believe that she answers prayers or performs miracles (or otherwise intervenes in human or nonhuman aff airs). Th e evidence for miracles is non-existent, and people who pray for luck, or health, or whatever aren't any luckier, or healthier, or whatever than people who don't. To be sure, Plantinga's aim in chapters 1–4 isn't to procure converts to creationism or to the doctrine of divine action. His aim is to show that there is no confl ict between science and these religious doctrines. And, in a limited way, he has done that; that is, he has shown that, logically, the former doesn't preclude the latter (something this reviewer, at least, never doubted), because it could be (for example) that God created organisms via the 293 process of evolution. But the believer scarcely has grounds for claiming victory. Why? Suppose it is true that the evidence that evolution is not divinely guided is inconclusive. It doesn't follow from this that the hypothesis that it is divinely guided is just as respectable as the hypothesis that it isn't. To see this, note the following argument: Th ere is no conclusive evidence to demonstrate that conspiracy theory c of event y is false; therefore, c is just as respectable as any opposing non-conspiracy theory of y. Th is argument is fallacious. Even if the evidence against c is inconclusive, it doesn't follow that c is just as respectable as any non-conspiracy theory. We have certain standards of evidence, and we know what would count as evidence for c. Th us, in the (assumed) absence of evidence for c we are rationally obliged to believe it is false, or at least rationally obliged to withhold judgement on whether or not it's true. It follows that there is a (non-logical) confl ict between c and the available non-conspiracy theory: the latter is evidentially more respectable than the former. Similarly, even if the evidence that evolution is not divinely guided is inconclusive, it doesn't follow that the hypothesis that it is divinely guided is just as respectable as the hypothesis that it isn't. Th ere is no evidence of evolution's being divinely guided (more on this below). Th us, in the absence of evidence for such guidance, we are rationally obliged to believe that there hasn't been any of it, or at least rationally obliged to withhold judgement on whether or not there has been any of it. It follows that there is a (non-logical) confl ict between the view that evolution is divinely guided and the view that it isn't: the latter is evidentially more respectable than the former. In chapter 5, Plantinga defends the thesis that "developments in evolutionary psychology and historical Biblical criticism do not off er, or even threaten to off er, defeaters for Christian or theistic belief " (130). His central premise for this thesis is that "describing the origin of religious belief and the cognitive mechanisms involved does nothing ... to impugn its truth" (140). Th is is true, but, as Brian Leiter has shown, "we should be suspicious of the epistemic status of beliefs that have the wrong causal etiology. Th at's the lesson of the Gettier counterexamples [to the justifi ed true belief model of knowledge]" (Leiter 2004, 104). In other words, explaining a belief 's causal etiology can impugn its warrant, even if it does not impugn its truth. If you believe that Bert is guilty of the crime based on evidence collected by Sally, and then discover that Sally has been planning to frame Bert, you no longer have a reason to believe that Bert is guilty, even though it might turn out that he is. In short, you have what Plantinga (165) calls an undercutting defeater for your belief (as opposed to a rebutting defeater, which shows that a belief is false). Plantinga is cognizant of this diffi culty, but he isn't bothered by it. In response to the Freudian explanation of theistic belief-that it arises from what Freud calls "wish-fulfi llment"- Plantinga says that "it is at least possible that God gets us to be aware of him by way of a mechanism like wish-fulfi llment" (149). Yes, that is possible, but why on earth should anyone believe it? We should expect the Freudian explanation of theistic belief to be false given theism unless a good-i.e., independent, non-ad hoc-reason can be given for thinking that God gets us to be aware of him by way of wish-fulfi llment. Compare: it is possible, let us assume, that Bert is guilty of the crime despite Sally's eff orts to frame him, but unless an independent, non-ad hoc reason can be given for thinking that he's guilty despite Sally's eff orts to frame him, one's belief that he's guilty is unwarranted. In the absence of such a reason, it would be irrational for one to continue believing he's guilty on the grounds that one really wishes he were and that it's possible that he is. In chapter 6, Plantinga argues that what he calls Simonian science, which is science that specifi es how things look from a perspective characterized by methodological naturalism (MN), does not provide the believer with a defeater for her belief. I would have thought it was obvious that MN does not provide the believer with a rebutting defeater for her belief-that's a tall order anyway-but I would have thought it was equally obvious that it provides the believer with an undercutting defeater for her belief. We don't appeal to the help of supernatural agents to develop vaccines, build atomic bombs, clone sheep, 294 etc., so why should we appeal to the help of supernatural agents to develop a theory of how life evolved or of how the universe came to be? Th at is to say, science's commitment to MN is a posteriori: scientists adhere to the method because of the terrifi c scientifi c results it yields. And the success of naturalistic methods makes it unnecessary to posit supernatural entities (whatever those might be). But if it is unnecessary to posit supernatural entities, then there is no reason to persist in believing in them (and perhaps even something of a reason to disbelieve in them). In chapter 7, Plantinga examines fi ne-tuning arguments, i.e., arguments that attempt to show that the alleged fi ne-tuning in the structure of the universe is evidence of intelligent design. He concludes that fi ne-tuning "off ers some slight support for theism" (224). It is unclear how he is able to help himself even to this very weak conclusion, however. Even if (contrary, as I see it, to fact-Plantinga ignores the work of physicists who claim that the universe isn't fi ne-tuned) the universe is fi ne-tuned, and even if (contrary, as I see it, to fact) fi ne-tuning off ers support for intelligent design, it off ers no support whatever for theism. Th is is so for at least eight reasons: (1) multiple designers are possible, as Hume argued; (2) the designer need not be omniscient; (3) the designer need not be omnipotent; (4) the designer need not be omnipresent; (5) the designer need not be benevolent (never mind omnibenevolent), or even non-malevolent; (6) the designer need not be a person, or even a psychological being; (7) the designer need not be eternal; and (8) the designer need not be a supernatural entity-e.g., it could be a physical or "enmattered" entity (e.g., from a diff erent universe). Plantinga might think he knows on other grounds the identity of the fi ne-tuner, but that is irrelevant, for his claim is that fi netuning, not some other ground, off ers support for theism. Perhaps, though, I've gotten him wrong. Perhaps all he is saying is that since any explanation of the fi ne-tuning in the structure of the universe that doesn't appeal to a designer is, by his lights, unacceptable, we have to consider explanations that do appeal to a designer, and among them is the theistic explanation. But this doesn't narrow the fi eld non-negligibly, since there are an infi nite number of possible explanations, both natural and supernatural, that appeal to a designer (e.g., if you posit an explanation according to which there were four designers, I can posit an explanation according to which there were fi ve, and so on ad infi nitum). In chapter 8, Plantinga examines, without due attention to the literature, Michael Behe's infamous thesis that so-called "irreducibly complex" biological structures-i.e., biological structures that could not have come to be by gradual, step-by step evolution-provide evidence of intelligent design. He proposes that the best way to construe Behe's defence of intelligent design is as non-argumentative design discourses that "present us with epistemic situations in which the rational response is design belief-design belief for which there aren't strong defeaters" (264). Th e idea, more fully, is that organisms appear designed, and if something appears designed, then, in the absence of strong defeaters, the rational response is to believe it is designed, in roughly the same way that, à la phenomenal conservatism, if an object appears blue, then, in the absence of strong defeaters, the rational response is to believe it is blue. He concludes that "Behe's design discourses do support theism, although it isn't easy to say how much support they off er" (264). Th ere are a number of serious problems with this chapter. First, Plantinga's defence of irreducible complexity, and the inference from it to design belief, is markedly sparse. He does discuss one reply to Behe's arguments, Paul Draper's (2002), but replies by Kenneth Miller, Elliot Sober, Sahotra Sarkar, Graham Oppy, Michael Ruse, Paul Gross, Robert Pennock, and other elegant critics aren't so much as mentioned. At one point he says that "the reviewers seem to suff er from an inability to pay attention to what Behe actually says" (234). Perhaps some reviewers suff er from this inability, but many-indeed most-do not. Second, Plantinga tries to rebut the objection that there are (undercutting) defeaters for design belief-e.g., that the appearance of design can be explained by natural processes without resorting to the contrivances of an external, supernatural agent-by simply exploiting our (ever diminishing) 295 ignorance of the evolution of biochemical and cellular systems. For example, he asserts that "for these structures at the cellular and molecular level, there aren't (yet) any Darwinian accounts or explanations" (258). (Would Plantinga renounce his design beliefs if there were?) But this sort of appeal to ignorance, while de rigeur among proponents of intelligent design, is, as it has always been, dialectically idle. Yes, there are gaps in our knowledge of the evolution of these systems, and yes, intelligent design advocates maintain that a specifi c kind of design theory, one which posits a supernatural intelligence, is required to bridge these gaps. But nobody who isn't antecedently committed to supernaturalism will be motivated by anything Plantinga says to bridge these gaps this way. And this is because he gives no reason-there isn't one-to suppose that they can't be bridged (eventually) with a plausible Darwinian explanation. In fact, Plantinga himself suggests that they can be when he says that "there are reasonably plausible Darwinian explanations at the anatomical level for many structures and systems; that fact should perhaps reduce the confi dence with which one forms design beliefs at the cellular level" (259). But then, without argument, he dismisses these explanations as an "extremely partial defeater" of design belief. And third, Plantinga slants the playing fi eld against Darwinians, contending both that there are gaps in our knowledge of the evolution of biochemical and cellular systems and that among the proff ered detailed Darwinian accounts of these systems "there isn't a lot beyond just-so stories" (258). So it would seem that, on Plantinga's view, if biologists ignore gaps in our knowledge of the evolution of biochemical and cellular systems, they are conceding, if only tacitly, that intelligent design theory is worth taking seriously. But if they try to bridge these gaps by providing a detailed Darwinian account of some biochemical or cellular system, they are merely telling just-so stories. Th is manoeuvre eff ectively removes Darwinians from the playing fi eld altogether-more or less by fi at! In the last chapter, Plantinga off ers yet another version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. Th is is the "deep confl ict between science and naturalism" part of his thesis. Th e argument has been muchdiscussed and, in my judgement, refuted. Th e version Plantinga presents in this book doesn't, as far as I can tell, have the resources to defl ect certain extant objections-by, e.g., Fodor (1998) and Churchland (2009). As I expect is plain, I cannot recommend this book, but given Plantinga's reputation, it will no doubt come to enjoy more esteem than many better books on science and religion. Greg JANZEN University of Calgary References Churchland, Paul 2009: "Is Evolutionary Naturalism Self-Defeating?". Philo 12, 135–41. Draper, Paul 2002: "Irreducible Complexity and Darwinian Gradualism". Faith and Philosophy 19, 3–21. Fodor, Jerry 1998: "Is Science Biologically Possible? Comments on Some Arguments of Patricia Churchland and of Alvin Plantinga". In: Jerry Fodor, In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 189–202. Leiter, Brian 2004: "Th e Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud". In: Brian Leiter (ed.), Th e Future for Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 74–105.